Rijndael algorithm was selected as the advanced encryption standard in 2001 after five year long security evaluation; it is well proven in terms of its strength and efficiency. The substitution box is the back bone of the cipher and its strength lies in the simplicity of its algebraic construction. The present paper is a study of the construction of Rijndael Substitution box and the effect of varying the design components on its cryptographic properties.
INTRODUCTION
The advanced encryption standard (AES) * developed by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, Rijndael 1,2 was selected by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as in 2001. It is a symmetric block cipher-based on the Shannon substitution-permutation network. AES has long been an area of interest for the researchers due to its:
Well proven security: A a 5-year evaluation procedure by • NIST and it is designed to be resistant to linear, differential and mount attacks. Efficiency: The speed of encryption and decryption of • AES is the fastest compared to any other cipher of similar strength.
Design simplicity: The cipher has a simple and elegant • structure that can easily be split into its components.
Most of the earlier works relating to AES are linked to its performance evaluation and straight forward implementation [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] including the various pipelined architecture. Some simplification 8, 9 in the AES algorithm had been attempted. However, this simplifications lead to vulnerabilities 10 in the algorithm. A great amount of work has also been done in fast pipelined implementation [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] of the algorithm. Rijmen proposal of AES S-box implementation based on the composite fields 16 was a significant step to compact AES. Some work in optimum construction 17 of these composite fields has been done. Some study on the replacement 18 of the design parameters of the Rijndael algorithm has been done. It was suggested that this leads to creation of new ciphers equivalent in strength to the original. However, certain properties 19 of substitution box (S-box) has been identified, which are profoundly affected by the changes in design components. Recent works relating to AES S-box include the optimised implementation of the S-box using residues of prime numbers 20 , a lightweight mix columns implementation for AES 21 and a proposal of a new algorithm to construct secure keys for AES 22 is published. This paper focuses on the study of the algebraic construction of the S-box of the AES algorithm, which is the main strength of the cipher. The effect of the change in the design components of the S-box on its cryptographic properties has been analysed. It provides an insight to the AES S-box construction to generate a conceptual framework for all future customization of the algorithm targeted at the S-box design level.
BASIC STRUCTURE OF ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD
Full description of the AES algorithm can be obtained in FIPS 2 197 . The input and the output for AES are each bit sequences containing 128-bits. However, AES allows cipher keys of all 128-bits, 192-bits, or 256-bits lengths. The input 128 bits are arranged in a 4×4 matrix, termed the 'state' and all byte operations are performed in the Galois field GF (2 8 ). The cipher is specified in terms of repetitions of processing steps that are applied to make up rounds of keyed transformations between the input plain-text and the final output cipher-text. A set of reverse rounds are applied to transform cipher-text back into the original plain-text using the same encryption key. The encryption of data is done in number of rounds: In all these operations, the SubBytes deserve a special mention as this step involves the S-box. The S-box is the back bone of the cipher; it provides nonlinearity in the encryption process and plays an important role in key scheduling.
ALGEBRAIC PRELIMINARIES AND S-BOX CONSTRUCTION
For the study of algebraic construction of the S-box a theorem is stated here without proof.
Theorem 1
let p be a non-zero element of a principle ideal domain R then, R/(p) will be a field if and only if, p is irreducible 23 . According to this theorem, for a prime p Galios field . In this field, addition ⊕ and multiplication  are defined by the XOR operation and polynomial multiplication modulo the generating polynomial respectively.
An S-box is a transformation
is constructed by substituting each element with its inverse and applying a suitable affine transformation s 
The motivation for this S-box design is to be resistant to differential, linear cryptanalysis and interpolation attacks. The core design is a simple transformation
this mapping has a simple algebraic expression. However, the simplicity itself makes it vulnerable to attacks like the interpolation attack. Therefore, it is combined with a suitable affine transformation:
The affine mapping is so chosen that, it has a very simple description, but a complicated algebraic expression. If combined with the 'inverse' mapping, it can be seen as modular polynomial multiplication followed by addition 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 
CHARACTERISTICS OF A GOOD S-BOX AND BIAS PARAMETERS
To study the characteristics of a good S-box 1 2 , ....., n x x x . Characteristics of the good S-box are, it has to: be balanced
Each of these criteria's are explained in the following subsection. However, most of these are satisfied only for an ideal case and not in practical level. So, biases from each of these criterions are derived.
Balancedness Property
This property states that each of the Boolean functions of the S-box should be balanced, i.e., the number of ones and zeros in the truth table of the Boolean function must be equal.
Propagation Criterion
A Boolean function is said to satisfy propagation criterion of degree k and order m, if any function obtained by keeping m input bits fixed f(x) changes with probability half, whenever i (1≤ i≤ k) bits of x are complemented. 
then a function is said to satisfy the propagation criterion of degree k and order m,
The propagation criterion is the measure of randomness of the differences in output pairs to the input pairs. This is a very important criterion as the bias of the distribution of the differences of the output pairs and the input pairs is utilised in the differential cryptanalysis of the conventional ciphers.
Definition
Propagation criterion bias of a Boolean function of degree k and order m is defined by 19 :
For the S-box:
The propagation criterion of degree one and order zero is very well known criterion, termed as the strict avalanche criterion (SAC). The criterion is satisfied, if whenever a single input bit is complemented, each of the output bits changes with a probability 1 2 .
Correlation Immunity Criterion
A Boolean function is to satisfy a correlation immune of order m, if it is statistically independent of combination of any m input bits. Mathematically, if m input bits are fixed then the functions g obtained from Boolean function f must satisfy:
where W(f) denotes the Hamming weight of a Boolean function given by the number of x for which the function attains a nonzero value.
Definition : The correlation immunity bias of order m for a Boolean function is defined by 19 :
The correlation immunity bias of S-box is given by 
Input/output Bit-to-Bit Entropy
This parameter represents the amount of information about the value of input bit, if the value of the output bit is known. The entropy of a single output function is given by 24 
:
2 2 1 ( ) log ( ) (1 -) log (1-)
where P i , is the fraction of 1's in the output column of the truth 
Nonlinearity
An affine Boolean function does not provide an effective confusion. To overcome this, functions which are as far as possible from being an affine function are needed. The effectiveness of these functions is measured by a parameter called nonlinearity.
Definition : Nonlinearity of a Boolean function is measured
by the Hamming distance to the set of affine functions 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The S-box is constructed by the transformation: 1 8 8 8 , where, (2 ),
gl (2) and (2 ).
All the variations in its construction without altering the simple algebraic expression are looked into and their effects in the bias parameter values are analysed. One of the major changes that can be brought about without altering the algebraic expression is by changing the underlying field to isomorphic fields. Another option is to change the affine matrix A and third is changing the vector b.
Change in the Underlying Field to Isomorphic
Fields Isomorphic fields to the underlying field can be generated by using different irreducible polynomials of the same degree. Number of irreducible polynomials of degree n over gF(p) is given by: The irreducible polynomials and the values of the bias parameters of the respective S-boxes constructed on isomorphic field generated by them are shown in Table 1 .
It can be observed from Table 1 that values of the bias parameters can be enhanced on changing to isomorphic fields as in the case of the irreducible polynomial 8 6 5
1. x x x x + + + + 
Change in the Affine Matrix
Another variation in the S-box design component can be brought about by changing the affine matrix A. The affine matrix 8 (2) A GL ∈ , the general linear group of degree 8 over gF (2) and the order of this group is: 
Hence, the number of matrix A available to be used for varying the S-box is numerous. So, to analyse the effect of such change on the bias parameter values instead of performing an exhaustive search over this group, a random search has been done. For this, a square binary matrix of size 8 is randomly generated. The matrix is discarded, if found to be singular and another matrix is generated again. This non-singular randomly generated matrix is used in the construction of S-box and the bias parameters are computed. This process is implemented in Matlab and is repeated 500 times. Few randomly generated affine matrices obtained on 500 such random searches are: 
Some of the observed bias parameter values obtained due to the change in the affine matrix in the random search are shown in Table 2 . and O(GF (2 8 )) = 256 therefore, ∃ total 256 different vector b (including the one used in the AES) that can be used in the S-box construction. However, it is observed that change in the translation vectors has no impact on the values of the bias parameters. Only the number of fixed and conjugate fixed points of the S-box varies with it. It was observed that the nonlinearity (N=112) of the AES S-box was not affected by any of the above mentioned changes.
CONCLUSIONS
Rijndael algorithm accepted as the AES is a well proven and an efficient cipher. The S-box forms a backbone of this cipher and is designed with a very simple algebraic expression. This paper studies the construction of its S-box and explores the possible design variations without altering its simple algebraic expression. The effect of these changes on the cryptographic properties of the S-box has also been analysed. The main aim of this study is to provide an insight to the AES S-box construction to generate a conceptual framework for all possible customization on the cipher targeted at the S-box design level. It is observed that by changing the underlying field into the isomorphic fields improves the properties to some level. A similar effect is observed for the change in the affine matrix. However, change in the translation vector shows no effect in the cryptographic properties of the S-box.
